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THIRD CIRCUIT CONFUSION: NCAA
V. CHRISTIE AND AN
OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND
FEDERALISM
ZACHARY BUCKHEIT*
INTRODUCTION
The Framers of the United States Constitution envisioned a
system of dual-sovereignty,1 where the state and federal governments
would be independent of one another, constantly competing for
power.2 The Framers believed this system would lead to state and
federal governments that were both diverse and sensitive to their
citizens’ needs, increase democratic participation, and also encourage
innovation and experimentation in forms and methods of
governance.3 The very structure of the Constitution reflects this
principle of dual sovereignty,4 and the Framers further cemented it
into American law with the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.5
The anti-commandeering doctrine has been the Supreme Court’s
weapon of choice when seeking to enforce the Tenth Amendment’s
prohibition against conscripting state legislatures and officials and
obliging them to carry out federal policies.6 The Supreme Court,
however, has only used this doctrine to declare an act of Congress
unconstitutional twice in its history.7 NCAA v. Christie provides the
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2019.
1. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
2. Id. at 458.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 457 (“As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual
sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government.”).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. X. (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people.”).
6. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 900 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 146 (1992).
7. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 900 (holding that the federal government cannot force a state to
administer federal programs and regulations); New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (holding that the
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Supreme Court with an opportunity to do so again and maintain the
balance between state and federal power that the Framers enshrined
in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court should declare the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”)—as interpreted by both the federal
government and the Third Circuit—unconstitutional for two reasons.
First, PASPA violates the anti-commandeering doctrine endorsed by
the Supreme Court by preventing individual states from modifying or
repealing their state laws, effectively forcing them to implement
federal policies. Second, PASPA frustrates the aims of federalism by
restricting state legislatures’ ability to experiment with novel
legislation and negates the political accountability that the Tenth
Amendment is meant to ensure.
I. FACTS
PASPA’s key provision provides that neither states nor individuals
may
[S]ponsor, operate, advertise, or promote . . . a lottery, sweepstakes,
or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based directly or
indirectly (through the use of geographical references or
otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur
or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate,
or on one or more performances of such athletes in such games.8

PAPSA’s prohibition on private persons is limited to gambling
that is conducted “pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental
entity.”9 States, on the other hand, are subject to an additional
restriction under PASPA that forbids them from licensing or
authorizing by “law or compact” any gambling activities related to
amateur or professional athletes.10
There were several exceptions to PASPA’s broad prohibition
against gambling.11 State-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada and
sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware were exempted from
PASPA’s regulation.12 Additionally, New Jersey was given a one year

federal government cannot force a state to administer federal programs and regulations).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2012).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 3702(2).
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702(1), 3701.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a).
12. Id. (These states were allowed to continue sponsoring sports wagering due to their
already extended history of doing so).
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window in which to set up a sports gambling system which would then
be exempt from PASPA’s prohibition.13 When PASPA was enacted in
1992, New Jersey’s constitution and state laws forbade sports
gambling, and the state did not legalize the activity within the granted
one year window.14
New Jersey has been seeking to legalize sports gambling and other
forms of gambling since 2010 when they began assessing the public’s
desire to change the New Jersey constitution to permit legalized
sports gambling.15 In 2011, an amendment was proposed and
successfully adopted into the New Jersey Constitution that allowed
the state legislature to legalize sports wagering in casinos and at
racetracks in Atlantic City.16 In 2012, the New Jersey state legislature
passed the Sports Wagering Act (“SWA”) to bring this constitutional
amendment to life.17 The SWA allowed for sports wagering at casinos
and racetracks across New Jersey.18 Five sports leagues19 quickly filed
suit against the parties responsible for enforcing the SWA in New
Jersey (“The New Jersey Parties”), claiming that the SWA violated
PASPA and seeking to enjoin the state statute from being
implemented.20 The New Jersey Parties freely admitted that the SWA
violated PASPA, but claimed that PASPA was unconstitutional
because it violated the anti-commandeering doctrine.21 The New
Jersey District Court found PASPA constitutional,22 and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its decision.23 The court of appeals
held that PASPA did not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine
because it merely prohibited states from affirmatively authorizing

13. Id.
14. See N.J. CONST. Art. IV § VII ¶ 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:37-2 (West 2017); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:40-1 (West 2017).
15. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 2016).
16. N.J. CONST. Art. IV, § VII, ¶2(D)
17. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 393.
18. Id.
19. The five sports leagues were the National Collegiate Athletic Association, National
Football League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and the Office of
the Commissioner of Baseball, doing business as Major League Baseball. Id. at 393 n.1.
20. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 393.
21. Id.
22. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 579 (D.N.J. 2013)
(“After careful consideration of the Parties’ submissions, the Court has determined that PASPA
is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ powers . . . .”).
23. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 240 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“Having examined the difficult legal issues raised by the parties, we hold that nothing in
PASPA violates the U.S. Constitution.”).
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sports wagering by law, and states could still repeal their existing antigambling laws.24
In 2014, the New Jersey state legislature tried legalizing gambling
once again with the passage of SB 2460.25 SB 2460 did not purport to
legalize gambling, but rather to merely repeal any existing
prohibitions on sports betting as they applied to New Jersey casinos
and racetracks in apparent compliance with the Third Circuits’
previous ruling.26 SB 2460 left in place existing prohibitions forbidding
betting on New Jersey college team competitions and any collegiate
competition that occurred in New Jersey.27 The law additionally
prohibited sports betting at the newly deregulated casinos and
racetracks for individuals younger than 21 years of age.28
The same five sports leagues that sued to enjoin the SWA in 2012
sued to enjoin the New Jersey Parties from giving effect to SB 2460.29
The District Court ruled in favor of the sports leagues, and the Third
Circuit affirmed their decision.30 On June 27, 2017, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.31
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Although the Supreme Court has only struck down acts of
Congress as violations of the anti-commandeering doctrine twice in its
long history,32 the doctrine itself has deep roots in American
jurisprudence.33 Functionally, the anti-commandeering doctrine
prevents the federal government from using state legislatures and
officials as mere tools for the implementation of federal policies and
regulations.34 Congress can provide incentives to states to try to
encourage them to assist the federal government in enforcing
regulations and policies, but Congress cannot coerce the states into
24. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, NO. 16-476 (U.S.
June 27, 2017) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
25. N.J. STAT. ANN. §5:12A-7 (West 2017).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 394 (3d Cir. 2013).
30. Id.
31. Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, NO. 16-476 (U.S. June 27, 2017).
32. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 900 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 146 (1992).
33. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161–66 (summarizing the historical background of the anticommandeering doctrine).
34. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a
federal regulatory program.”).
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providing that assistance; such coercion would violate the Tenth
Amendment and run afoul of the anti-commandeering doctrine.35 The
Supreme Court has addressed the problem of anti-commandeering
separately for the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of state
governments.
The Supreme Court first dealt with the commandeering of state
judicial branches in Testa v. Katt.36 At issue in Testa was the federal
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, which allowed any person who
bought goods for more than the prescribed ceiling price to sue the
seller in any court of competent jurisdiction, state or federal.37 Testa
successfully sued Katt in Rhode Island state court for selling him a car
in excess of the price ceiling.38 On appeal, the Rhode Island State
Supreme Court reversed, holding that state courts need not enforce
the penal laws of the federal government.39 The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed and ultimately held that the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution binds state courts to hear cases that Congress gives them
jurisdiction over if comparable claims under state law would be heard
in the same venue. This has effectively allowed Congress to
commandeer state judicial branches to enforce federal regulations
and policies.40
The same cannot be said of state executive branches. In Printz v.
United States,41 the federal government attempted to use states as an
instrument to enforce federal policy, an attempt that the Supreme
Court ultimately found to be unconstitutional.42 The federal statute at
issue in Printz was the Brady Act, which established national instant
background checks for all handgun sales.43 While the background
check system was being developed and implemented, the Brady Act
required local chief law enforcement officers (“CLEOs”) to perform
the background checks themselves.44 Several of these CLEOs filed
suit against the federal government, saying that forcing them to
implement background checks to effectuate a federal law was an
35. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
36. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
37. Id. at 387.
38. Id. at 388.
39. Testa v. Katt, 47 A.2d 312, 314 (R.I. 1946).
40. Testa, 330 U.S. at 392–94.
41. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
42. Id. at 935.
43. Id. at 898.
44. Id.
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unconstitutional commandeering of state executive branches.45 The
District Courts of both Montana and Arizona agreed that the
background check requirements for the CLEOs were
unconstitutional, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
finding the entirety of the Brady Act constitutional.46 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and ultimately held that the federal
government cannot command executive branch officials to administer
or enforce federal regulatory programs.47
Finally, in New York v. United States,48 the Supreme Court
grappled with whether the federal government could “commandeer
the States’ legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce a federal regulatory program.”49 At issue in New York was
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,
which was an attempt by the federal government to get states to
provide for the disposal of waste created inside their borders.50 The
Act provided monetary incentives for the states to create waste
disposal plans and provided access incentives in the form of disposal
facility access to the states that met their Act imposed deadlines.51 The
Act also imposed a “take title” requirement on any state that did not
legislate to create a waste disposal plan.52 This requirement forced
states to take title to and possession of any waste created by a waste
generator as well as paying those generators any and all damages
caused by the state’s failure to take possession.53
When a waste generator attempted to enforce the take title
requirement against New York, the state filed suit, arguing it was
unconstitutional to force states to either legislate as the federal
government desired or be severely penalized by the take title
requirement of the Act.54 The New York District Court dismissed the
state’s case, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed their

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 935 (“The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States
to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. . . . [S]uch commands are
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”).
48. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
49. Id. at 145.
50. Id. at 144.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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decision.55 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
although the incentives provided in the Act were constitutional, the
take title requirement was not.56 The Court reasoned that the take
title requirement intruded into the state sovereignty protected by the
Tenth Amendment by offering “two unconstitutionally coercive
alternatives—either accepting ownership of waste or regulating
according to Congress’ instructions.”57 The Court ruled that Congress
could not “commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.”58
Printz, decided in 1997, was the last time the Supreme Court struck
down an Act of Congress for violating the anti-commandeering
doctrine.59 The doctrine has never been overruled, and Testa, Printz,
and New York are still controlling law when determining whether
Congress has unconstitutionally commandeered a branch of state
government.60
III. HOLDING
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court of
New Jersey’s ruling that PASPA did not unconstitutionally
commandeer the New Jersey state legislature.61 The court focused on
the fact that New Jersey’s “selective repeal” of its anti-wagering
regulations did in fact violate PASPA because it amounted to an
authorization of said wagering “by selectively dictating where sports
gambling may occur, who may place bets in such gambling, and which
athletic contests are permissible subjects for such gambling.”62 The
court also held that PASPA does not run afoul of the anticommandeering doctrine because it does not “command states to take
affirmative actions, and it does not present a coercive binary choice.”63

55. Id.
56. Id. at 145.
57. Id. at 146.
58. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981)).
59. Elbert Lin and Thomas M. Johnson Jr., Symposium: High Stakes for Federalism in
Heavyweight Clash over the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 17, 2017, 2:44
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-high-stakes-federalism-heavyweight-clashanti-commandeering-doctrine/.
60. Id.
61. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d at 402.
62. Id. at 396.
63. Id. at 401.
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IV. ARGUMENTS
Petitioner’s arguments primarily assert that PASPA violates the
Tenth Amendment and the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine by
requiring states to maintain laws they would otherwise repeal.
Petitioner also argues that PASPA diminishes the accountability of
the federal officials who are truly responsible for PASPA by forcing
states to maintain the legislation that furthers PASPA’s policy goals.
A. Does PASPA Violate the Tenth Amendment and the Court’s AntiCommandeering Doctrine?
Petitioner argues that PASPA, as interpreted by the Third Circuit,
violates the anti-commandeering doctrine.64 Congress cannot
determine the content of states’ laws because the determination of
those laws is an attribute of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth
Amendment.65 PASPA, the Petitioner argues, does exactly that by
forbidding New Jersey to make changes to its sports wagering laws.66
New Jersey is effectively forced to govern as Congress wills when it
comes to the matter of sports wagering, which violates the Tenth
Amendment and the anti-commandeering doctrine.67 Petitioner also
argues that PASPA is not saved from unconstitutionality by the Third
Circuit’s assertion that the state need not take any affirmative action
for two main reasons.68 First, forcing New Jersey to reinstate laws
against sports wagering is affirmative action in and of itself,69 and
second, because the affirmative action distinction makes no
difference; preventing a state from repealing a law is functionally
equivalent to forcing it to pass a new one.70
Petitioner distinguishes PASPA from other legislation challenged
for commandeering state branches but ultimately declared
constitutional by the Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association, Inc.71, F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi.72 Reno v.
64. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 24, at 21.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 22.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 24–25.
69. Id. at 25.
70. Id.
71. 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (The Surface Mining Act is challenged by the state of Virginia for
allegedly violating the Tenth Amendment and found to be a constitutional use of Congress’
commerce clause powers to preempt conflicting state regulation).
72. Fed. Energy Regulation Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (The Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act is challenged by the state of Mississippi as a violation of the
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Condon,73 and South Carolina v. Baker.74 Petitioner asserts that
PASPA is neither a federally administered regulatory program states
are choosing to defer to nor legislation regulating states as individuals
as the Supreme Court found in these cases.75 PASPA cannot be opted
out of by states as they could in F.E.R.C. and Hodel; states are
required to maintain their state law prohibitions;76 and they are not
being directly regulated themselves as they were in Reno and Baker,
but rather they are being forced to regulate their own citizens in their
sovereign capacities as states.77
Respondent argues that, since PASPA does not compel states to
take affirmative action and instead only prohibits them from
authorizing sports wagering, it cannot be in violation of the anticommandeering doctrine.78 New Jersey can repeal all of their sports
gambling prohibitions if they so choose; they simply cannot carry out
a targeted repeal that funnels gambling to Atlantic City.79 Respondent
asserts that the anti-commandeering doctrine only prohibits Congress
from imposing affirmative duties on states that force them to do
Congress’s bidding and that Congress can withdraw powers from
states via the Supremacy Clause at will.80
B. Does PASPA Diminish the Accountability of State or Federal
Elected Officials?
Petitioner also argues that the Third Circuit’s interpretation of
PASPA diminishes the accountability of state and federal elected
officials.81 When state officials are unable to legislate as their citizens
Tenth Amendment and found to not compel the exercise of state sovereign powers, but rather
to simply establish requirements for state action if the state wished to remain involved in
regulating an otherwise pre-emptible field).
73. 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (The Drivers Privacy Protection Act is challenged by the state of
South Carolina as a violation of the Tenth Amendment and found to be constitutional because
it does not require states to use their sovereign powers to regulate their own citizens, but rather
regulates the states themselves).
74. 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (Section 310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
is challenged by the state of South Carolina for violating the Tenth Amendment and found to be
constitutional because it does not compel states to use their sovereign powers to enact and
regulate a Congressional scheme, but rather directly regulates the states).
75. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 24, at 27–28.
76. Id. at 27.
77. Id. at 29.
78. Brief for Respondent at 22, Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, NO.
16-476 (U.S. June 27, 2017) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
79. Id.
80. Id. at 25–26.
81. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 24, at 29.
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wish them to because of federal regulation, it diminishes their
accountability to the electorate.82 PASPA, as interpreted by the Third
Circuit, prevents states from legislating freely and requires them to
maintain unpopular state laws.83 Citizens will potentially hold state
officials responsible for laws that the federal government is forcing
upon them instead of the federal officials truly responsible.84 This
method of legislating is bad for accountability because citizens are
unable to easily determine who is responsible for what legislation.85
Respondent argues in response that the federal government is
clearly responsible for PASPA and that there is no diminished
accountability for federal officials enforcing it.86 Respondent points
out the statute operates by directly regulating states, as only a federal
statute could, while also directly regulating the activities of private
citizens.87 Respondent further argues that the states are not required
to actively enforce PASPA and that federal officials do so, not state
officials, so there can be no confusion about the prohibition against
gambling being a federal regulation.88 Finally, Respondent points out
that the four years of litigation between the state of New Jersey and
the federal government over PASPA will have removed any
remaining doubt that PASPA, and its prohibition against sports
wagering, is a federal statute.89
V. ANALYSIS
PASPA, as interpreted by the Third Circuit, violates the anticommandeering doctrine. In 2014, the state of New Jersey repealed
one of their own laws, passed by their own state legislature years
prior. Remarkably, the federal government stepped in and told New
Jersey that they could not repeal their own laws and commanded the
state legislature to reinstate it. The federal government did not offer
New Jersey funding if they chose to reinstate the law, nor did it inform
New Jersey that the federal government would be enforcing the laws
provisions as a federal matter. Instead, Congress told New Jersey they
had to keep that particular law on the books. The Supreme Court held
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at 33.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id.
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in New York that Congress cannot compel states to “regulate
pursuant to Congress’s direction.”90 Dictating state laws either by
forcing their enactment or forcing their continued existence amounts
to functionally the same thing. Accordingly, PASPA’s restriction on
states’ abilities to repeal their own laws, in part or in whole, cannot be
constitutional in light of the anti-commandeering doctrine as laid out
in New York.91
A. PASPA Violates the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine.
The anti-commandeering doctrine established in New York strictly
prohibits Congress from commandeering state legislatures.92 In New
York, Congress was not directly ordering the states to legislate in a
particular way, but was instead threatening them with severe penalties
if states did not do as Congress wished.93 The Court found this form of
coercion to violate the anti-commandeering doctrine by not giving
states a meaningful choice as to whether or not they wished to adopt
legislation requested by the federal government.94 The mere fact that
states did not have a meaningful choice between adopting or not
adopting federal legislation was enough for the Court to find that
Congress had overstepped its bounds, violated the Tenth Amendment,
and infringed on state sovereignty.95
To respect the precedent established in New York, PASPA must be
found to violate the anti-commandeering doctrine. PASPA does not
merely coerce states into passing certain laws—as interpreted by the
Third Circuit, PASPA actually forbids a state from repealing their own
laws should they so choose.96 There is no meaningful difference
between forcing a state to pass a law and forcing them to retain one.97
In both instances, the state’s legislative branch is being
commandeered by Congress to advance Congressional policies and
purposes. PASPA, by forbidding the repeal of state laws, has the same

90. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174 (1992).
91. See id. at 188.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 175–76.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 188.
96. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 394 (3d Cir. 2016).
97. See Brief for Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 4,
Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, NO. 16-476 (U.S. June 27, 2017) (“Preventing the
state from repealing an existing law is no different from forcing it to pass a new one; in either
case, the state is being forced to regulate conduct that it prefers to leave unregulated.”) (quoting
Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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effect on state sovereignty that the Supreme Court decried as an
unacceptable violation of the Tenth Amendment in New York in
1992.98 When Congress tells a state legislature what laws it can and
cannot repeal, Congress effectively takes control of that legislative
branch and uses it as a tool for implementing federal policy, a practice
the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional.99 At the heart of
state sovereignty is the state’s power to repeal or create its own laws;
therefore, this power must have been reserved to the states by the
Tenth Amendment.100 Any invasion of that power is a violation of the
Tenth Amendment and must be struck down by the Court.
B. PASPA Frustrates the Aims of Federalism.
By restricting the ability of states to repeal their own laws, PASPA
frustrates the aims of federalism and nullifies the numerous benefits
that can be derived from a system of dual sovereignty. These benefits
include increased political accountability for officials and the
potential for states to serve as laboratories of democracy.101
The political accountability of state and federal officials is
damaged by PASPA, as interpreted by the Third Circuit. Congress, via
PASPA, is forcing New Jersey to help implement a federal prohibition
against gambling while hiding its influence behind a screen of state
laws it requires to remain in place. Practically, this means that when
the citizens of New Jersey look for who is responsible for their
inability to gamble, they will point the finger at state officials instead
of where the blame really belongs—the federal government. This
allows the federal government to achieve its objectives without fear of
political repercussions.102
PASPA also severely curtails the ability of the states to serve as
laboratories of democracy. One of the main benefits of the separate
federal and state systems is the ability to have states try out ideas on a
smaller scale.103 For example, several states across the country are

98. Id. at 2.
99. New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
100. U.S. CONST. amend X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people.”).
101. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
102. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 578, 578 (2012) (“[W]hen the State has
no choice, the Federal Government can achieve its objectives without accountability.”) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
103. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311.
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currently experimenting with marijuana legalization, despite its
illegality at the federal level. These states provide a relatively low risk
arena in which to judge the positive and negative effects of legalizing
the drug. PASPA’s vice grip on the ability of New Jersey to legalize
sports wagering denies New Jersey an opportunity to experiment with
sports wagering legislation and to learn from its success or failure in a
similar fashion.
CONCLUSION
The Framers established a dual system of government meant to
protect state sovereignty from encroachment by a powerful federal
government. The Tenth Amendment was the Framers’ solution, and
the anti-commandeering doctrine is the Supreme Courts’ way of
giving that amendment teeth in a world where state power is in
decline. The doctrine, however, is not self-executing, and it is up to the
Supreme Court to see that it is used to protect traditional areas of
state sovereignty from federal invasion. Thus, the Supreme Court
should use the anti-commandeering doctrine to prevent PASPA from
infringing on the New Jersey legislature’s right to determine when to
repeal their own state laws.

